



## **IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment**

Project:

3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter  
Software Revision 7.0 and Above

Company:

Emerson Automation Solutions (Rosemount, Inc.)  
Shakopee, MN  
USA

Contract No.: Q24/07-064

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Ted Stewart

## Management Summary

This report summarizes the results of the functional safety assessment according to IEC 61508 carried out on the:

- 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter: Coplanar Differential & Coplanar Gage
- 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter: Coplanar Absolute, In-line Gage, and In-Line Absolute

The functional safety assessment performed by *exida* consisted of the following activities:

- *exida* assessed the development process used by Rosemount through an audit and review of a detailed safety case against the *exida* certification scheme which includes the relevant requirements of IEC 61508. The assessment was executed using subsets of the IEC 61508 requirements tailored to the work scope of the development team.
- *exida* reviewed and assessed a detailed Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the devices to document the hardware architecture and failure behavior.
- *exida* reviewed field failure data to verify the accuracy of the FMEDA analysis.
- *exida* reviewed the manufacturing quality system in use at Rosemount.

The functional safety assessment was performed to the requirements of IEC 61508:2010. A full IEC 61508 safety case was prepared using the *exida* SafetyCase tool as the primary audit tool. Hardware and software process requirements and all associated documentation were reviewed. Environmental test reports were reviewed. The user documentation and safety manual were also reviewed.

The results of the Functional Safety Assessment can be summarized by the following statements:

**The audited development process, as tailored and implemented by the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter development project, complies with the relevant safety management requirements of IEC 61508 SIL 3.**

**The assessment of the FMEDA, done to the requirements of IEC 61508, has shown that the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter can be used in a high demand safety related system in a manner where the PFH is within the allowed range for SIL 3 according to table 3 of IEC 61508-1.**

**The assessment of the FMEDA, done to the requirements of IEC 61508, has shown that the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter can be used in a low demand safety related system in a manner where the  $PFD_{AVG}$  is within the allowed range for SIL 3 according to table 2 of IEC 61508-1.**

**The assessment of the FMEDA also shows that the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter meets the requirements for architectural constraints of an element such that it can be used to implement a safety function with the following constraints:**

- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 1<sub>H</sub> (low/high demand) where  $SFF \geq 90\%$
- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 2<sub>H</sub> (low demand)
- SIL 2 @ HFT=1, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 2<sub>H</sub> (high demand)



This means that the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter is capable for use in SIL 2 and SIL 3 applications in Low demand mode and High demand mode when properly designed into a Safety Instrumented Function per the requirements in the Safety Manual and when using the versions specified in section 3.1 of this document.

The manufacturer will be entitled to use the Functional Safety Logo.



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# 1 Purpose and Scope

This document shall describe the results of the IEC 61508 functional safety assessment of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter by *exida* according to the accredited *exida* certification scheme which includes the requirements of IEC 61508: 2010.

The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate the compliance of:

- the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter with the technical IEC 61508-2 and -3 requirements for SIL 3 and the derived product safety property requirements

and

- the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter development processes, procedures and techniques as implemented for the safety-related deliveries with the managerial IEC 61508-1, -2 and -3 requirements for SIL 3.

and

- the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter hardware analysis represented by the Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis with the relevant requirements of IEC 61508-2.

The assessment has been carried out based on the quality procedures and scope definitions of *exida*.

The results of this assessment provide the safety instrumentation engineer with the required failure data per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511 and confidence that sufficient attention has been given to systematic failures during the development process of the device.

## 1.1 Tools and Methods used for the assessment

This assessment was carried by using the *exida* Safety Case tool. The Safety Case tool contains the *exida* scheme which includes all the relevant requirements of IEC 61508.

For the fulfillment of the objectives, expectations are defined which builds the acceptance level for the assessment. The expectations are reviewed to verify that each single requirement is covered. Because of this methodology, comparable assessments in multiple projects with different assessors are achieved. The arguments for the positive judgment of the assessor are documented within this tool and summarized within this report.

All assessment steps were continuously documented by *exida* (see [R1] and [R4]).

## 2 Project management

### 2.1 *exida*

*exida* is one of the world's leading accredited Certification Bodies and knowledge companies, specializing in automation system safety and availability with over 500 years of cumulative experience in functional safety. Founded by several of the world's top reliability and safety experts from assessment organizations and manufacturers, *exida* is a global company with offices around the world. *exida* offers training, coaching, project-oriented system consulting services, safety lifecycle engineering tools, detailed product assurance, cyber-security and functional safety certification, and a collection of on-line safety and reliability resources. *exida* maintains a comprehensive failure rate and failure mode database on process equipment based on 250 billion hours of field failure data.

### 2.2 Roles of the parties involved

Emerson Automation Solutions (Rosemount, Inc.)	Manufacturer of the 3051S
<i>exida</i>	Performed the IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment

Rosemount contracted *exida* with the IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment of the above-mentioned devices.

### 2.3 Standards / Literature used

The services delivered by *exida* were performed based on the following standards / literature.

[N1]	IEC 61508 (Parts 1 - 7): ed. 2, 2010	Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
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### 2.4 Reference documents

The documents in this section were updated during the 2022 surveillance audit.

#### 2.4.1 Documentation provided by Rosemount

[D1]	DOC-004425	Product Design and Development Process
[D2]	DOC-004410	Engineering Change Order
[D3]	EDP 400-500	Peer Review Procedure
[D4]	EDP 400-300	Configuration and Change Management Work Instruction
[D6]	Functional_Safety_Requirements_Specification.doc	Functional Safety Requirements Specification for the Rosemount 3051S
[D7]	D9900093	Rosemount 3051S System Requirements Document
[D10]	00809-0100-4801	Product Safety Manual for 3051S
[D11]	Safety Impact Analysis 3051S.doc	Safety Impact Analysis for Rosemount 3051S

[D12]	SIS_SM_Project_Plan.doc	Project Plan for Rosemount 3051S
[D13]	Safety_Validation_Test_Plan.doc	Safety Validation Test Plan for Rosemount 3051S
[D14]	Safety_Validation_Test_Report_ROM7.doc	Safety Validation Test Report for the Rosemount 3051S
[D20]	fsrs_cons_log_sis_super_module.xls	Inspection Report – Rosemount 3051S Functional Safety Requirements Specification
[D21]	Project Plan Review Log.xls	Inspection Report – Rosemount 3051S Inspection Plan
[D23]	sis_module_lint_output.txt	Output from PC LINT
[D24]	Rom7_code_review_log.xls	Code Review Inspection Report
[D25]	Sis_supermodule_design_review_log.xls	Design Review Inspection Report
[D26]	SIS_SuperModule_Integration_Test.doc	Rosemount 3051S Integration Test Specification and Report
[D27]	SM_SIS_Action_Items.doc	Rosemount 3051S Action Item List
[D28]	svtp_cons_log_sis_supermodule.xls	Inspection Report for Safety Validation Test Plan
[D29]	CERT-09218-2005-AQ-HOU-ANAB	ISO 9001_2015 Certificate Rosemount Shakopee Chanhassen Eden Prairie USA
[D30]	DOC-004343	Rosemount Inc. Quality Manual

#### 2.4.2 Documentation generated by *exida*

[R1]	ROS V1R6 Baseline Procedures	Emerson Rosemount Process SafetyCase
[R2]	ROS 05/05-05 R001, FMEDA, V2R4, August 1, 2024	Rosemount 3051S FMEDA Report
[R3]	Coplanar II 3051S – with proof test coverage.xls	Detailed FMEDA for Rosemount 3051S Coplanar Board
[R4]	Rosemount Pressure Transmitter SafetyCase	Detailed safety case documenting results of assessment (internal document, updated)



[R5]	ROS 1105075 R001 V1R3 Remote Seal FMEDA_Rosemount.doc; April 29, 2013, or later	Rosemount 1199 Remote Seal FMEDA Report
[R6]	ROS 13-04-008 R001 V2R1 Primary Elements FMEDA Rosemount; June 17, 2021, or later	Rosemount Primary Elements FMEDA Report
[R7]	Surveillance Audit Checklist - Rosemount 3051s.xlsx	IEC 61508 Surveillance Case for 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter
[R8]	Q22-07-028 3051S and DA2 PIU	Field Failure Analysis for 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter
[R9]	Failure Rates for the Certificates_3051S - 1 August 2024.docx	Failure Rate Tables for 3051S Certificate

## 2.5 Assessment Approach

The certification audit was closely driven by requirements of the *exida* scheme which includes subsets filtered from IEC 61508.

The assessment was planned by *exida* and agreed with Rosemount.

The following IEC 61508 objectives were subject to detailed auditing at Rosemount:

- FSM planning, including
  - Safety Life Cycle definition
  - Scope of the FSM activities
  - Documentation
  - Activities and Responsibilities (Training and competence)
  - Configuration management
  - Tools and languages
- Safety Requirement Specification
- Change and modification management
- Software architecture design process, techniques and documentation
- Hardware architecture design - process, techniques and documentation
- Hardware design / probabilistic modeling
- Hardware and system related V&V activities including documentation, verification
  - Integration and fault insertion test strategy

- Software and system related V&V activities including documentation, verification
- System Validation including hardware and software validation
- Hardware-related operation, installation and maintenance requirements

The project teams, not individuals were audited.

### 3 Product Description

The 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter, Software Revisions 7.0 and above, is a two-wire 4 – 20 mA smart device used in multiple industries for both control and safety applications.

The FMEDA has been performed for four different configurations of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter, i.e., Coplanar, In-Line, Level, and Flow configurations. The 3051S Pressure Transmitter series include the following measurement configurations:

- 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter: Differential and Gage Coplanar  
Capacitance technology is utilized for differential Coplanar measurements.
- 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter: Coplanar Absolute, In-line Gage and In-line Absolute  
Piezoresistive sensor technology is used for the absolute Coplanar and In-line measurements.
- 3051S 4-20mA HART Level Transmitter  
A 3051S Pressure Transmitter is available as a Level assembly. The 3051S Level transmitter can be used to measure level on virtually any liquid level vessel. 3051S transmitters and seal systems are designed to offer a flexible solution to meet the performance, reliability, and installation needs of nearly any level measurement application.
- 3051S 4-20mA HART Flowmeter  
A 3051S Pressure Transmitter can be combined with primary elements to offer fully assembled flowmeters. The direct mount flowmeter capability eliminates troublesome impulse lines associated with traditional installations. With multiple primary element technologies available, 3051S flowmeters offer a flexible solution to meet the performance, reliability, and installation needs of nearly any flow measurement application. The flowmeters covered for this assessment are based on the Rosemount 1195, 405, and 485 primary elements. Excluded from the assessment are models with Flo-Tap, remote mount, or temperature input options.

Devices used in safety applications must have option code QT. Devices used in safety applications with ambient temperatures below -40F (-40C) but does not exceed -76F(-60C) requires options BR5 (-50C) or BR6 (-60C) and QT.

The 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter is classified as a Type B<sup>1</sup> device according to IEC 61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter can be connected to the process using an impulse line, depending on the application the clogging of the impulse line needs to be accounted for, see section 5.1 of the FMEDA report [R2].

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<sup>1</sup> Type B element: “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2, ed2, 2010.

### 3.1 Hardware and Software Version Numbers

This assessment is applicable to the following hardware and software versions of 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter:

Model	Software Version
3051S...QT	7.0 or above

Note that the QT option indicates the device has been certified to IEC 61508.

## 4 IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment

*exida* assessed the development process used by Rosemount for this development project against the objectives of the *exida* certification scheme. The results of the assessment are documented in [R1] and [R4]. All objectives have been considered in the Rosemount development processes for the development.

*exida* assessed the set of documents against the functional safety management requirements of IEC 61508. This was done by a pre-review of the completeness of the related requirements and then a spot inspection of certain requirements before the development audit.

The safety case documents the fulfillment of the functional safety management requirements of IEC 61508-1 to -3.

The detailed development audit (see [R1] and [R4]) evaluated the compliance of the processes, procedures and techniques, as implemented for the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter, with IEC 61508.

The assessment was executed using the *exida* certification scheme which includes subsets of the IEC 61508 requirements tailored to the work scope of the development team.

The result of the assessment shows that the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter is capable for use in SIL 3 applications, when properly designed into a Safety Instrumented Function per the requirements in the Safety Manual.

### 4.1 Product Modifications

The modification process has been successfully assessed and audited, so Rosemount may make modifications to this product as needed.

As part of the *exida* scheme a surveillance audit is conducted prior to renewal of the certificate. The modification documentation listed below is submitted as part of the surveillance audit. *exida* will review the decisions made by the competent person in respect to the modifications made.

- List of all anomalies reported
- List of all modifications completed
- Safety impact analysis which shall indicate with respect to the modification:
  - The initiating problem (e.g., results of root cause analysis)
  - The effect on the product / system
  - The elements/components that are subject to the modification
  - The extent of any re-testing
- List of modified documentation
- Regression test plans

## 5 Results of the IEC 61508 Functional Safety Assessment

*exida* assessed the development process used by Rosemount during the product development against the objectives of IEC 61508 parts 1, 2, and 3, see [N1]. The development of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter was done using this development process. The Safety Case was updated with project specific design documents.

### 5.1 Lifecycle Activities and Fault Avoidance Measures

Rosemount has an IEC 61508 compliant development process as defined in [D1]. The process defines a safety lifecycle which meets the requirements for a safety lifecycle as documented in IEC 61508. Throughout all phases of this lifecycle, fault avoidance measures are included. Such measures include design reviews, FMEDA, code reviews, unit testing, integration testing, fault injection testing, etc.

This functional safety assessment investigated the compliance with IEC 61508 of the processes, procedures and techniques as implemented for the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter development. The investigation was executed using subsets of the IEC 61508 requirements tailored to the SIL 3 work scope of the development team. The result of the assessment can be summarized by the following observations:

The audited Rosemount development process complies with the relevant managerial requirements of IEC 61508 SIL 3.

#### 5.1.1 Functional Safety Management

##### FSM Planning

The functional safety management of any Rosemount Safety Instrumented Systems Product development is governed by [D1]. This process requires that Rosemount create a project plan [D12] which is specific for each development project. The Project Plan defines all of the tasks that must be done to ensure functional safety as well as the person(s) responsible for each task. These processes and the procedures referenced herein fulfill the requirements of IEC 61508 with respect to functional safety management.

##### Version Control

All documents are under version control as required by [D4].

##### Training, Competency recording

Competency is ensured by the creation of a competency and training matrix for the project. The matrix lists all of those on the project who are working on any of the phases of the safety lifecycle. Specific competencies for each person are listed on the matrix which is reviewed by the project manager. Any deficiencies are then addressed by updating the matrix with required training for the project.

#### 5.1.2 Safety Requirements Specification and Architecture Design

As defined in [D1] a safety requirements specification (SRS) is created for all products that must meet IEC 61508 requirements. For the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter, the safety integrity requirements specification (SIRS) [D6] contains a system overview, safety assumptions, and safety requirements sections. During the assessment, *exida* reviewed the content of the specification for completeness per the requirements of IEC 61508: ed2, 2010.

Requirements are tracked throughout the development process by the creation of a series of traceability matrices which are included in the following documents: [D6] and [D13]. The system requirements are broken down into derived hardware and software requirements which include specific safety requirements. Traceability matrices show how the system safety requirements map to the hardware and software requirements, to hardware and software architecture, to software and hardware detailed design, and to validation tests.

Requirements from IEC 61508-2, Table B.1 that have been met by Rosemount include project management, documentation, structured specification, inspection of the specification, and checklists.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.1 that have been met by Rosemount include backward traceability between the safety requirements and the perceived safety needs.

### **5.1.3 Hardware Design**

Hardware design, including both electrical and mechanical design, is done according to [D1]. The hardware design process includes creating a hardware architecture specification, a peer review of this specification, creating a detailed design, a peer review of the detailed design, component selection, detailed drawings and schematics, a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA), electrical unit testing, fault injection testing, and hardware verification tests.

Requirements from IEC 61508-2, Table B.2 that have been met by Rosemount include observance of guidelines and standards, project management, documentation, structured design, modularization, use of well-tried components, checklists, semi-formal methods, computer aided design tools, simulation, and inspection of the specification. This meets the requirements of SIL 3.

### **5.1.4 Software (Firmware) Design**

Software (firmware) design is done according to [D1]. The software design process includes software architecture design and peer review, detailed design and peer review, critical code reviews, static source code analysis and unit test.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.2 that have been met by Rosemount include fault detection, error detecting codes, failure assertion programming, diverse monitor techniques, stateless software design, retry fault recovery mechanisms, graceful degradation, forward and backward traceability between the software safety requirements specification and software architecture, semi-formal methods, event-driven, with guaranteed maximum response time, static resource allocation, and static synchronization of access to shared resources.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.3 that have been met by Rosemount include suitable programming language, strongly typed programming language, language subset, and increased confidence from use for the tools and translators.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.4 that have been met by Rosemount include semi-formal methods, computer aided design tools, defensive programming, modular approach, design and coding standards, structured programming, forward traceability between the software safety requirements specification and software design. This meets the requirements of SIL 3.

### 5.1.5 Validation

Validation Testing is done via a set of documented tests. The validation tests are traceable to the Safety Requirements Specification [D6] in the validation test plan [D13]. The traceability matrices show that all safety requirements have been validated by one or more tests. In addition to standard Test Specification Documents, third party testing is included as part of the validation testing. All non-conformities are documented in a change request and procedures are in place for corrective actions to be taken when tests fail as documented in [D1].

Requirements from IEC 61508-2, Table B.5 that have been met by Rosemount include functional testing, functional testing under environmental conditions, interference surge immunity testing, fault insertion testing, project management, documentation, static analysis, dynamic analysis, and failure analysis, expanded functional testing and black-box testing.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.7 that have been met by Rosemount include process simulation, functional and black box testing, and forward and backward traceability between the software safety requirements specification and the software safety validation plan. This meets SIL 3.

### 5.1.6 Verification

Verification activities are built into the standard development process as defined in [D1]. Verification activities include the following: Fault Injection Testing, static source code analysis, module testing, integration testing, FMEDA, peer reviews and both hardware and software unit testing. In addition, safety verification checklists are filled out for each phase of the safety lifecycle. This meets the requirements of IEC 61508 SIL 3.

Requirements from IEC 61508-2, Table B.3 that have been met by Rosemount include functional testing, project management, documentation, and black-box testing.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.5 that have been met by Rosemount include dynamic analysis and testing, data recording and analysis, functional and black box testing, performance testing, interface testing, and test management and automation tools.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.6 that have been met by Rosemount include functional and black box testing, performance testing, and forward traceability between the system and software design requirements for hardware/software integration and the hardware/software integration test specifications

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.9 that have been met include static analysis, dynamic analysis and testing, forward traceability between the software design specification and the software verification plan.

This meets the requirements of SIL 3.



### 5.1.7 Modifications

Modifications are done per the Rosemount's change management process as documented in [D2] and [D4]. Impact analyses are performed for all changes once the product is released for integration testing. The results of the impact analysis are used in determining whether to approve the change. The standard development process as defined in [D1] is then followed to make the change. The handling of hazardous field incidents and customer notifications is governed by DOP 1440. This procedure includes identification of the problem, analysis of the problem, identification of the solution, and communication of the solution to the field. This meets the requirements of IEC 61508 SIL 3.

Requirements from IEC 61508-3, Table A.8 that have been met by the Rosemount modification process include impact analysis, reverify changed software modules, reverify affected software modules, revalidate complete system or regression validation, software configuration management, data recording and analysis, and forward and backward traceability between the software safety requirements specification and the software modification plan (including reverification and revalidation)

### 5.1.8 User documentation

Rosemount created a safety manual for the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter [D10] which addresses all relevant operation and maintenance requirements from IEC 61508. This safety manual was assessed by *exida*. The final version is considered to be in compliance with the requirements of IEC 61508.

Requirements from IEC 61508-2, Table B.4 that have been met by Rosemount include operation and maintenance instructions, maintenance friendliness, project management, documentation, and limited operation possibilities.

This meets the requirements for SIL 3.

## 5.2 Hardware Assessment

To evaluate the hardware design of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter, a Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was performed by *exida* for each component in the system. The FMEDA was verified using Fault Injection Testing as part of the development, and as part of the IEC 61508 assessment.

A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration. An FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is an FMEA extension. It combines standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design.

Failure rates are listed in the FMEDA reports for each important failure category. Refer to the FMEDA [R2] for a complete listing of the assumptions used and the resulting failure rates.

The FMEDA results must be considered in combination with  $PFD_{AVG}$  or PFH and architectural constraints of other devices of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The Safety Manual states that the application engineer should calculate the  $PFD_{AVG}$  or PFH for each defined safety instrumented function (SIF) to verify the design of that SIF.

The FMEDA analysis shows that most of the reviewed 3051 models have a Safe Failure Fraction > 90% (assuming that the logic solver is programmed to detect over-scale and under-scale currents) and therefore those models meet Route 1<sub>H</sub> hardware architectural constraints for up to SIL 2 as a single device and SIL 3 with Hardware Fault Tolerance of 1.

The 1<sub>H</sub> approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.

The 2<sub>H</sub> approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to 7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508.

The failure rate data used for this analysis meets the *exida* criteria for Route 2<sub>H</sub> and the diagnostic coverage is  $\geq 60\%$ . Therefore all of the reviewed 3051 models meet the Route 2<sub>H</sub> hardware architectural constraints for up to SIL 2 as a single device when the listed failure rates are used.

If the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter is one part of an element the architectural constraints should be determined for the entire sensor element

The architectural constraint type for the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter Series is B. The required SIL determine the level of hardware fault tolerance that is required per requirements of IEC 61508 or IEC 61511. The SIS designer is responsible for meeting other requirements of applicable standards for any given SIL as well.

The analysis shows that design of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter meets the hardware requirements of IEC 61508, SIL 2 @HFT=0 and SIL 3 @ HFT=1.

## 6 2022 IEC 61508 Functional Safety Surveillance Audit

### 6.1 Roles of the parties involved

Rosemount	Manufacturer of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter
<i>exida</i>	Performed the hardware assessment review
<i>exida</i>	Performed the IEC 61508 Functional Safety Surveillance Audit per the accredited <i>exida</i> scheme.

Rosemount contracted *exida* to perform the surveillance audit for the above 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter. The surveillance audit was conducted remotely.

### 6.2 Surveillance Methodology

As part of the IEC 61508 functional safety surveillance audit the following aspects have been reviewed:

- Procedure Changes – Changes to relevant procedures since the last audit are reviewed to determine that the modified procedures meet the requirements of the *exida* certification scheme.
- Engineering Changes – The engineering change list is reviewed to determine if any of the changes could affect the safety function of the 3051S 4-20mA HART Pressure Transmitter.
- Impact Analysis – If changes were made to the product design, the impact analysis associated with the change will be reviewed to see that the functional safety requirements for an impact analysis have been met.
- Field History – Shipping and field returns during the certification period will be reviewed to determine if any systematic failures have occurred. If systematic failures have occurred during the certification period, the corrective action that was taken to eliminate the systematic failure(s) will be reviewed to determine that said action followed the approved processes and was effective.
- Safety Manual – The latest version of the safety manual will be reviewed to determine that it meets the IEC 61508 requirements for a safety manual.
- FMEDA Update – If required or requested the FMEDA will be updated. This is typically done if there are changes to the IEC 61508 standard and/or changes to the *exida* failure rate database.
- Recommendations from Previous Audits – If there are recommendations from the previous audit, these are reviewed to see if the recommendations have been implemented properly.

### 6.3 Documentation provided by Rosemount for Surveillance

Documentation updates provided by Rosemount or by *exida* are included in Section 2.4.

## **6.4 Surveillance Documentation generated by *exida***

Documentation updates provided by Rosemount or by *exida* are included in Section 2.4.

## **6.5 Surveillance Results**

### **6.5.1 Procedure Changes**

Procedure changes were reviewed and were found to be consistent with the requirements of IEC 61508.

### **6.5.2 Engineering Changes**

The engineering changes since the last assessment were reviewed and were found to be consistent with the requirements of IEC 61508.

### **6.5.3 Impact Analysis**

All relevant impact analysis were reviewed.

### **6.5.4 Field History**

The operating hours were reviewed for the previous 3 years and successfully meet the requirements of IEC61508.

### **6.5.5 Safety Manual**

Reviewed Safety Manual (00809-0100-4801) and it successfully met the requirements of IEC61508.

### **6.5.6 FMEDA Update**

No FMEDA changes were needed for this Surveillance Audit.

### **6.5.7 Evaluate use of certificate and/or certification mark**

The Rosemount website was searched and no misleading or misuse of the certification or certification marks was found.

### **6.5.8 Previous Recommendations**

There were no previous recommendations to be assessed by this assessment.

## 7 Terms and Definitions

Architectural Constraint	The SIL limit imposed by the combination of SFF and HFT for Route 1 <sub>H</sub> or by the HFT and Diagnostic Coverage (DC applies to Type B only) for Route 2 <sub>H</sub>
<i>exida</i> criteria	A conservative approach to arriving at failure rates suitable for use in hardware evaluations utilizing the 2 <sub>H</sub> Route in IEC 61508-2.
Fault tolerance	Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors (IEC 61508-4, 3.6.3).
FIT	Failure In Time ( $1 \times 10^{-9}$ failures per hour)
FMEDA	Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance
Low demand mode	Mode where the demand interval for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than twice the proof test interval.
High demand mode	Mode where the demand interval for operation made on a safety-related system is less than 100x the diagnostic detection/reaction interval, or where the safe state is part of normal operation.
PFD <sub>AVG</sub>	Average Probability of Failure on Demand
PFH	Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour
Random Capability	The SIL limit imposed by the Architectural Constraints for each element.
SFF	Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.
SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
SIS	Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).
Systematic Capability	The SIL limit imposed by the robustness of the design process and the methods used to avoid systematic faults in the design as described in the IEC 61508 tables.
Type A element	“Non-Complex” element (using discrete components); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2
Type B element	“Complex” element (using complex components such as micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2

## 8 Status of the Document

### 8.1 Liability

*exida* prepares reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. *exida* accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based.

### 8.2 Version History

Contract Number	Report Number	Revision Notes
Q24/07-064	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V4R1	Updates for High Demand and PFH; VAM 1 August 2024
Q22/07-028	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V4R0	Renewal; TES 10/26/2022
Q18/11-012	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V3R0	2019 Surveillance Audit; DEB 7/26/2019
Q15/10-010	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V2R2	included cold temperature; updated template; recertification; TES 10/14/16
Q13/04-008	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V2R1	updated to IEC 61508 2010 standard and incorporated route 2 <sub>H</sub> ; TES; 9/5/14
Q06/12-018	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V1R2	updated from Q06-12-18, incorporated new template, and updated to incorporate Rosemount feedback/comments for cert; Rosemount decided no route 2H at this time; TES; May 2, 2013
Q06/12-018	ROS 06-12-018 R001 V1R1	Released to Emerson, December 22, 2006


Reviewer/Approver: V4, R1: Dan Alley; August 1, 2024

Status: Released


### 8.3 Future Enhancements

At request of client.

### 8.4 Release Signatures



Ted E. Stewart, CFSP, *exida*CSP, Evaluating Assessor



Loren L. Stewart, CFSE, Certifying Assessor / Approver

*Valerie Motto*

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Valerie Motto, CFSP, Safety Engineer

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Dan Alley, CFSE, Senior Safety Engineer

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